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Abstract
Using a simple two-region model where local or central regulators set bank capital
requirements as risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, we demonstrate the importance
of capital requirements being set centrally when cross-region spillovers are large and local
regulators suffer from substantial regulatory capture. We show that local regulators may
want to surrender regulatory power only when spillover effects are large but the degree
of supervisory capture is relatively small, and that bank capital regulation at central
rather than local levels is more beneficial the larger the impact of systemic risk and the
more asymmetric is regulatory capture at the local level.
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1 Introduction
The banking industry has experienced significant global integration over the last two
decades, with banks expanding their activities beyond the authority of their local su-
pervisors. When the regulatory architecture in place does not allow for the interdepen-
dencies between countries or regions that result from this financial integration, financial
stability can be impaired. This problem is particularly relevant in Europe and in the
US. In Europe, regulation and supervision of banks used to be national responsibilities;
under the evolving ”Single Supervisory Mechanism”, ”significant” banks are supervised
directly by the European Central Bank (ECB), whereas smaller banks continue to be
under national supervision. The U.S., on the other hand, has historically evolved into
a dual supervisory system in which each depository institution is subject to regulation
by its chartering authority (state or federal) and one of the federal primary regulators.1
When economies have multiple regulators at possibly different levels, the question of
what kind of arrangement is optimal from an overall perspective becomes crucial. Our
paper aims to contribute to this discussion.
A growing theoretical literature examines such interactions of banks and regula-
tors/supervisors and their institutional design implications. Several papers analyze the
interplay between multinational banking activities and national supervision when the
latter does not internalize its impact on the welfare of other countries (Holthausen and
Rønde (2004), Calzolari and Loranth (2011), Beck et al. (2013), Agur (2013), Niepmann
and Schmidt-Eisenlohr (2013)). Other authors focus on coordination problems between
different banking regulators, which might be in different countries or have different ob-
jectives (Acharya (2003), Kahn and Santos (2005), Dell’Ariccia and Marquez (2006),
Morrison and White (2009), Hardy and Nieto (2011)).
Several recent contributions have begun to focus more on the divergence between lo-
cal and central regulators’ objectives and their means to implement them. Colliard
(2015) examines optimal supervisory architecture in a federal/international context
where local supervisors have incentives to engage in forbearance as they do not allow for
the cross-border externalities of a bank’s distress, but also have more information about
1The Office of the Comptroller of the Currency, the Federal Reserve and the Federal Deposit In-
surance Corporation are in charge of federally chartered banks, state member banks and state non
member banks, respectively.
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domestic banks than a central supervisor.2 In a similar set-up, Carletti et al. (2016)
demonstrate that even small differences in central and national supervisors’ objectives
may lead to inferior bank monitoring compared to completely centralized or national
supervisory structures; local supervisors may prefer ignorance to acquiring information
that might lead the central supervisor to decide against local interests. Go´rnicka and
Zoican (2016) take these arguments further by arguing that the supranational regulator
can actually distort bank risk-taking incentives as it is unable to commit to ex post
inefficient bank liquidations, so that supranational resolution of insolvent banks does
not necessarily improve welfare.
Our paper is most closely related to this more recent literature on optimal ”vertical”
bank regulatory structure. Whereas Colliard (2015), Carletti et al. (2016) and Go´rnicka
and Zoican (2016) examine optimal bank resolution arrangements in frameworks that
either take bank capital as given or abstract from it altogether, we specifically focus
on the arguably no less important issue of optimal bank capital regulation, aiming to
explore under what circumstances central bank regulation and/or supervision might be
preferable to local one in this context.3 For this, we develop a simple two-region model
where local or central regulators set capital requirements as either risk sensitive capital
or leverage ratios.4 Local regulators are concerned about expected costs of their banks
failing and the opportunity cost of capital, but ignore interregion spillovers associated
with bank failures. A central regulator internalizes the positive spillover effects of higher
capital ratios, but faces a potentially higher cost of observing bank types than local
regulators due to its supervisory “remoteness”; it may furthermore attach less weight
to banks’ opportunity cost of capital if exposed to less regulatory capture than local
regulators.
Our results demonstrate the importance of capital requirements being determined at
2Relevant empirical papers that examine differences in the behavior of bank supervisors at the
state/federal level in the US are Rezende (2011) and Agarwal et al. (2014); they find significant differ-
ences in their treatment of supervised banks.
3In common with these related papers, and in order to keep our analysis tractable, we abstract
from the inherent fragility arising from banks’ liquidity structure, which provides a role for a lender of
last resort in the avoidance of bank runs (Diamond and Dybvig (1983)). Goodhart and Huang (2000)
examine the related issue of the lender of last resort function being carried out at the international
level.
4Regulators in our framework impose either risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios, but never the
two together, as this would lead to suboptimal outcomes (see Section 2).
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a central level particularly when interregion or cross-country spillovers are large and local
regulators suffer from substantial degrees of regulatory capture. We further highlight
the importance for such a central regulator to deal with the potential issues relating to
supervisory “remoteness” in this context, and show that local regulators may be inclined
to surrender regulatory power to a central regulator only when spillover effects are large
but the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small. We also demonstrate that
bank capital regulation at the central rather than the local level is more beneficial the
larger the impact of systemic risk and the greater the degree of asymmetry in regulatory
capture at the local level.
The model is now developed in Section 2, our core results are derived and discussed in
Section 3, Section 4 presents several extensions to our analysis, and Section 5 concludes
the paper. All proofs are presented in the Appendix.
2 Model
To explore whether bank regulation and/or supervision should be set at central or local
levels, we develop a simple model of bank regulation in which banks are located in
symmetric regions/countries5 A,B and subject to capital regulation from local and/or
central regulators. We adopt the incentive approach to the modeling of solvency regu-
lations, initiated by Giammarino et al. (1993), assuming that banks are better informed
regarding their particular risk/return characteristics than the regulator(s).6
Banks Banks have projects that pay x > 1 with probability 1 − p and x = 0
otherwise, which are financed by raising deposits and capital. Deposits are protected
by deposit insurance, making bank debt risk-free. Expected bank profit is then Π =
(1− p) (x− (1− k))− kq, with cost of capital q > 1 and capital ratio 0 < k < 1. There
is imperfect information about bank type such that p can be ph = p + κ < 1 with
probability 0.5 and pl = p− κ > 0 otherwise, uncorrelated between regions.
5For simplicity we shall only refer to regions from now on.
6Our modeling choice of adapting a static, asymmetric information-based banking model, rather
than a DSGE model with financial frictions, allows for analytical tractability with closed form solutions.
Similar approaches are adopted throughout the related theoretical literature on interactions of banks,
regulators/supervisors and their institutional design implications, as surveyed in the introduction above.
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Regulators A central regulator considers objectives for the two regions jointly,
allowing for the social costs associated with bank failure, the benefits associated with
financial intermediation, as well as positive spillover effects of higher capital ratios in
one region on the other one. In line with Giammarino et al. (1993) and Prescott (2004),
these objectives are captured by the following (reduced form) loss function for the central
regulator
Λs = 2ms +
1
4
∑
i∈Θ
∑
j∈Θ
(piA(1− kiA)2 + ωskiA (q − 1) + φpjB(1− kjB)
+ pjB(1− kjB)2 + ωskjB (q − 1) + φpiA(1− kiA)) (1)
where ms > 0 is its cost of observing bank types in each region, and Θ = {h, l} is the
set of bank types. The first term in the double sum reflects the social cost associated
with bank failure in region A; the second term represents the opportunity cost of capital
in region A, with weighting factor ωs > 0 (a reduced form of bank profits reflecting the
benefits from financial intermediation); the third term captures the impact of negative
spillovers from bank failures in region B on region A, with weighting factor φ > 0; and
the remaining three terms represent the equivalent items for region B.7
Local regulators in regions A,B consider analogous objectives for their respective
regions, but ignore positive spillover effects of higher capital ratios on the other region.
The corresponding (reduced form) loss function for the local regulator in region A is
then
ΛnA = mn +
1
4
∑
i∈Θ
∑
j∈Θ
(piA(1− kiA)2 + ωnkiA (q − 1) + φpjB(1− kjB)) (2)
where mn is its cost of observing bank type, and ωn its weight on the opportunity cost
of capital; an analogous loss function applies to the local regulator in region B.
A central regulator, acting as a supervisor, faces a potentially higher cost of ob-
serving bank types than local regulators due to its supervisory “remoteness”; we thus
assume 0 < mn < ms. As a regulator, on the other hand, it may attach less weight to
banks’ opportunity cost of capital if it is exposed to less regulatory capture than local
7Our stylized setup assumes one bank per region. Our core results in Sections 2 and 3 would remain
unchanged if we allowed nA, nB banks in regions A,B, as long as their types are also uncorrelated.
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regulators; hence we assume ωn > ωs.
Optimal capital requirements Local or central regulators can observe bank
type at a cost, in which case they can impose risk sensitive capital ratios; otherwise
they have to resort to risk insensitive leverage ratios. Depending on whether or not it
chooses to discover bank type, a central regulator then either solves for the optimal risk
sensitive capital ratios ksh, ksl, by minimizing its loss function eq. (1) with respect to
kh, kl, obtaining
kshA = k
sh
B = 1 +
φ
2
− ωs(q − 1)
2(p+ κ)
, kslA = k
sl
B = 1 +
φ
2
− ωs(q − 1)
2(p− κ) (3)
or solves for optimal leverage ratios ks, by minimizing its loss function with respect to
k = kh = kl, giving
ksA = k
s
B = 1 +
φ
2
− ωs(q − 1)
2p
(4)
Local regulators, on the other hand, minimizing their loss functions eq. (2) in a
similar fashion, would solve for optimal risk sensitive capital ratios knh, knl or leverage
ratios kn as
knhA = k
nh
B = 1−
ωn(q − 1)
2(p+ κ)
, knlA = k
nl
B = 1−
ωn(q − 1)
2(p− κ) (5)
knA = k
n
B = 1−
ωn(q − 1)
2p
. (6)
We can observe that central leverage ratios are set higher than local ones; the same
holds true for the corresponding risk sensitive capital requirements. These results are
driven by the spillover effects that are internalized by the central regulator, and rein-
forced by its potentially more limited focus on the opportunity cost of capital. Leverage
ratios are higher than expected risk sensitive capital requirements at both local and
central levels, a result driven by the convexity in regulators’ loss functions.8
8Note also that a sufficient condition for optimal capital ratios to be bounded below one would e.g.
be φ < ωs(q − 1)/(p+ κ).
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Risk sensitive capital vs. leverage ratios As a first result that will prove
useful later, we can characterize what conditions would lead local and/or central regu-
lators individually to choose risk sensitive capital ratios over leverage ratios. We achieve
this by evaluating the local/central regulators’ respective loss functions eqs. (1) and (2)
using the corresponding optimal risk sensitive capital and leverage ratios from eqs. (3)–
(6), allowing us to state
Lemma 1. Both local and central regulators prefer risk sensitive capital ratios if ms <
m′s or leverage ratios if mn > m
′
n, where
m′n =
(q − 1)2κ2ω2n
4p(p2 − κ2) > m
′
s =
(q − 1)2κ2ω2s
4p(p2 − κ2) > 0.
Otherwise, central regulators prefer leverage ratios while local regulators prefer risk sen-
sitive capital ratios. The relative benefits of risk sensitive capital ratios are increasing in
regulators’ respective weights on the opportunity cost of capital ωs, ωn and the difference
in insolvency risk between bank types κ.
Regulators’ loss functions are assumed to be convex in payouts to depositors in
the case of bank failure, thus risk sensitive capital ratios improve on leverage ratios
to a larger extent the greater the difference in insolvency risk between bank types.
Discovering bank type is costly for regulators, however, giving rise to thresholds in
the cost of bank type discovery above which the reduction in expected losses from
bank failures associated with risk sensitive capital requirements is insufficient to be
worthwhile. Furthermore, as leverage ratios are higher than expected risk sensitive
capital ratios, both local and central regulators value the latter even more the greater
their emphasis on the opportunity cost of capital.
Whether local and/or central regulators prefer risk sensitive capital ratios or leverage
ratios thus depends on their respective costs of discovering bank type; the different
possible combinations are sketched in Figure 1. It is worthwhile noting that regulators
in our framework optimally choose to impose either risk sensitive capital or leverage
ratios, but never the two together; the leverage ratio would be binding for low-risk banks
in such a dual-instrument arrangement (as k > kl throughout), leading to suboptimal
outcomes.
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3 Optimal regulatory framework
We now go further to investigate whether an optimal regulatory and supervisory frame-
work involves setting bank capital requirements at either the local or central level, and
that in the form of either risk sensitive capital or leverage requirements. A social plan-
ner’s objectives would allow for the social costs associated with bank failure and the
benefits associated with financial intermediation in both regions, as well as the impact
of negative spillovers from bank failures in one region on the other one. In reduced
form, the social planner’s loss function would thus resemble that of the central plan-
ner’s given in eq. (1) above, but for potential differences in the weighting factors ω and
φ associated with the opportunity cost of capital and the spillover effect. For simplicity,
but without major loss of generality, we assume for the remainder of this paper that
the central regulator’s preferences coincide with the social planner’s. An examination
of which particular regulatory arrangements the social planner would consider best can
then be achieved by evaluating the central regulator’s loss function eq. (1) using the
respective optimal risk sensitive capital and leverage ratios from eqs. (3)–(6), while
allowing for the actual costs of discovering bank types incurred. For these comparisons,
we define ωd ≡ ωn − ωs as regulators’ weight differential on the opportunity cost of
capital, and md ≡ ms − mn as regulators’ (potential) cost differential of discovering
bank type; we further assume ωd < ωs for ease of analysis.
Evaluating the central regulator’s loss function using optimal leverage ratios at either
the central or local level in this way, and similarly for optimal risk sensitive capital ratios,
we can state
Lemma 2. Central leverage ratios are preferable to local ones throughout. Their relative
benefit is increasing in the size of the spillover φ and regulators’ weight differential on
the opportunity cost of capital ωd.
Central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferable to local ones if regulators’ cost
differential of discovering bank type md is below the threshold
m′d =
1
4
(
(q − 1)2φωd + p
(
φ2 +
(q − 1)2ωd2
p2 − κ2
))
> 0
and the reverse holds otherwise. The central risk sensitive capital ratios’ relative ben-
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efit is increasing in the size of the spillover φ, regulators’ weight differential on the
opportunity cost of capital ωd and the difference in insolvency risk between bank types
κ.
The central leverage ratios internalize the effect of spillovers arising from bank fail-
ures in the other region, which are ignored by local regulators in their setting of the
optimal leverage ratio. Additionally, local regulators are prone to be overly concerned
by the opportunity cost of capital due to stronger regulatory capture, leading to capital
requirements that are also too low from a central perspective.
As with leverage ratios, the central regulator internalizes the effect of interregion
spillovers in its setting of optimal risk sensitive capital ratios, which are not taken into
account by local regulators. Similarly, as local regulators overemphasize the opportu-
nity cost of capital, they set risk sensitive capital requirements that are even further
below what the central regulator would consider appropriate. These two benefits have,
however, to be weighed against the potentially greater cost faced by the central regu-
lator in determining bank type, due to the increased supervisory “remoteness” it faces.
This gives thus rise to a threshold in how large regulators’ cost differential of discovering
bank type can be before it negates the benefits brought by central risk sensitive capital
ratios in terms of internalization of spillovers and reduced exposure to regulatory cap-
ture. A natural consequence, relevant from an institutional design perspective, is then
that central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferable to local ones throughout when
central regulation is combined with supervision at the local level.
It is also interesting to evaluate the central regulator’s loss function using either
optimal central leverage ratios or optimal local risk sensitive capital ratios; we obtain
Lemma 3. Central leverage ratios are preferable to local risk sensitive capital ratios if
local regulators’ cost of discovering bank type mn is above the threshold
m′′n =
1
4
(
(q − 1)2(κ2ω2s − p2ωd2)
p(p2 − κ2) − φ (pφ+ 2ωd(q − 1))
)
whereas the reverse holds otherwise. The central leverage ratio’s relative benefit is in-
creasing in the size of the spillover φ and regulators’ weight differential on the opportu-
nity cost of capital ωd, but decreasing in the difference in insolvency risk between bank
8
types κ.
When local regulators’ cost of discovering bank type is larger than a given threshold,
the potential advantage of risk sensitive capital ratios over leverage ratios, which stems
from the convexity of regulators’ loss functions, is outweighed by the fact that the central
regulator internalizes the effect of interregion spillovers in the setting of optimal capital
ratios, and also may be less exposed to regulatory capture than local regulators. On
the other hand, local risk sensitive capital ratios can dominate central leverage ratios
when spillover effects, the degree of regulatory capture and the local regulators’ cost of
discovering bank type are sufficiently small or the difference in insolvency risk between
bank types is relatively large.
We can now draw on the relative results obtained so far to characterize the conditions
under which risk sensitive capital or leverage requirements determined at either the local
or central level are best overall from the viewpoint of the central regulator, and thus,
given our assumptions, the social planner. We obtain
Proposition 1. When either local or central regulators are also in charge of supervision,
the best type of capital requirement from an overall perspective is given as follows:
• When the local regulator’s cost of discovering bank type mn is above the threshold
m′′n, central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferable overall if the central regula-
tor’s cost of discovering bank type ms is below the threshold m
′
s, whereas central
leverage ratios are most preferred otherwise.
• When the local regulator’s cost of discovering bank type mn is below the threshold
m′′n, central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferable overall if regulators’ cost
differential of discovering bank type md is below the threshold m
′
d, whereas local
risk sensitive capital ratios are most preferred otherwise.
Clearly, regulators’ (relative) costs of discovering bank type are key in determin-
ing whether capital requirements set by local or central regulators are preferable, and
whether these should be in the form of risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios. Capital
requirements set by local regulators are best, in the form of risk sensitive capital ratios,
only if their cost of discovering bank type is sufficiently small in a scenario where local
9
and central regulators’ cost differential of discovering bank type is sufficiently large. In
all other scenarios, letting central regulators determine capital requirements emerges
as best, generally in the form of risk sensitive capital requirements, but for the case
where the central regulator’s cost of discovering bank type is sufficiently large to war-
rant implementation of a central leverage ratio instead.9 A natural consequence of these
results, with particular relevance from an institutional design perspective, is that cen-
tral regulation combined with supervision at the local level dominates the regulatory
framework where either local or central regulators are also in charge of supervision.
Our results are thus strongly supportive of the important role a central regulator can
play particularly when interregion spillovers are large and local regulators are exposed to
substantial degrees of regulatory capture. However, it also highlights the importance for
such a central regulator to address potential issues relating to supervisory “remoteness”
in this context, e.g. by delegating certain supervisory tasks to local supervisors that
may be able to carry these out more cost-efficiently.
4 Extensions
4.1 Shifting from local to central regulation
We now go one step further by examining whether local regulators might ever agree to
surrender regulatory power to a central regulator, or whether such a transition would
have to be imposed on them. Given the results obtained in the previous section, we
will frame this as a potential regulatory regime shift where a local regulator considers
whether or not to cede regulatory powers to a central authority, while retaining its
supervisory role in the case of regulation at the central level (i.e. ms = mn as a result).
Evaluating now local regulator’s loss function using optimal leverage ratios at ei-
ther the central or local level, and similarly for optimal risk sensitive capital ratios,
analogously to above, we can then state
Lemma 4. Local regulators perceive central leverage ratios as preferable to local ones if
9Additional comparative statics results are available in the Appendix.
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the spillover φ is above the threshold
φ′ =
(q − 1)ωd
p
> 0
whereas the reverse holds otherwise. The central leverage ratios’ relative benefit is de-
creasing in regulators’ weight differential on the opportunity cost of capital ωd.
Local regulators perceive central risk sensitive capital ratios as preferable to local ones
if the spillover φ is above the threshold
φ′′ =
2(q − 1)ωd
2
√
p2 − κ2 > 0
whereas the reverse holds otherwise. The central risk sensitive capital ratios’ relative
benefit is decreasing in regulators’ weight differential on the opportunity cost of capital
ωd and the difference in insolvency risk between bank types κ.
As local regulators ignore positive spillover effects of higher capital ratios on the
other region, central risk sensitive capital ratios or leverage ratios can nevertheless be
perceived as preferable by local regulators as long as those spillover effects are substantial
enough. This effect becomes weaker, however, the greater the weight differential on the
opportunity cost of capital between local and central regulators: the higher capital
ratios imposed by the central regulator are then perceived as being too costly by local
regulators as they are facing greater regulatory capture.
Furthermore, it is similarly helpful to evaluate local regulators’ loss function using
either optimal central leverage ratios or optimal local risk sensitive capital ratios; we
obtain
Lemma 5. Local regulators perceive central leverage ratios as preferable to local risk
sensitive capital ratios if the spillover φ is above the threshold
φ′′′ =
√
(q − 1)2(p2ωd2 + κ2ωs(2ωd + ωs))
p2(p2 − κ2) −
4mn
p
> 0 for mn ≤ m′n
whereas the reverse holds otherwise. The central leverage ratio’s relative benefit is in-
creasing in the local regulator’s cost of discovering bank type mn, but decreasing in
11
regulators’ weight differential on the opportunity cost of capital ωd and the difference in
insolvency risk between bank types κ.
We observe that, even from local regulators’ perspective, as long as their cost of
discovering bank type is larger than a given threshold, the potential advantage of risk
sensitive capital ratios over leverage ratios is outweighed by the fact that the central
regulator internalizes the effect of interregion spillovers in the setting of optimal capital
ratios. This effect obviously becomes stronger the more substantial those spillover
effects; it matters less, however, the greater the weight differential on the opportunity
cost of capital between local/central regulators and the more sizeable the difference in
insolvency risk between bank types.
We can now draw on the relative results obtained in this section to characterize the
conditions under which risk sensitive capital or leverage requirements determined at the
central level are also perceived as preferable from the viewpoint of local regulators. We
obtain
Proposition 2. Local regulators prefer to cede regulatory powers to a central authority,
retaining their supervisory role in the case of regulation at the central level, if
• the spillover φ is above the threshold φ′′ when the local supervisor’s cost of discov-
ering bank type mn is below the threshold m
′
s
• the spillover φ is above the threshold φ′ when the local supervisor’s cost of discov-
ering bank type mn is above the threshold m
′
n
• the spillover φ is above the threshold φ′′′ when the local supervisor’s cost of discov-
ering bank type mn lies between the thresholds m
′
s and m
′
n
whereas they would prefer to retain their local regulatory powers otherwise.
We thus observe that local regulators may generally be inclined to surrender regula-
tory power to a central regulator as long as the spillover effects at play are substantial
enough. However, this effect needs to be strong enough to outweigh the perceived dis-
advantage of relatively higher central capital ratios, stemming from local supervisors
greater concern about the cost of capital faced by banks, in line with their greater ex-
posure to supervisory capture.10 Which of those two effects then gains the upper hand
10Further comparative statics results are available in the Appendix.
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in practice is clearly an empirical question, and unfortunately lies largely outside the
influence of central regulators or policymakers more generally.
4.2 Role of systemic risk
Recent events put emphasis on the importance of systemic in addition to bank-level risk.
Systemic risk can be defined as ”the risk of threats to financial stability that impair the
functioning of a large part of the financial system with significant adverse effects on the
broader economy” (Freixas et al., 2015, p. 13). It is of interest to revisit our results of
Section 3 by characterizing what approach to bank capital regulation is best from an
overall perspective when we additionally allow for such a notion of systemic risk in this
context.
To approach this question, we remain within a framework where central regulation
is combined with supervision at the local level and rewrite the loss function faced by
the central regulator as
Λs = 2ms +
1
4
∑
i∈Θ
∑
j∈Θ
(piA(1− kiA)2 + ωskiA (q − 1) + (φ+ φs1i=h,j=h)pjB(1− kjB)
+ pjB(1− kjB)2 + ωskjB (q − 1) + (φ+ φs1i=h,j=h)piA(1− kiA)) (7)
where ms = mn, and φs > 0 is the differential spillover effect when both domestic and
foreign bank are of type h; this reflects that foreign bank failures may have greater
domestic impact when the banking sector is exposed to ”systemic risk” in this sense.
The corresponding loss function considered by the local regulator in region A is
ΛnA = mn +
1
4
∑
i∈Θ
∑
j∈Θ
(piA(1− kiA)2 + ωnkiA (q − 1) + (φ+ φs1i=h,j=h)pjB(1− kjB)) (8)
and an analogous loss function applies to the local regulator in region B.
Solving for local/central regulators’ optimal risk sensitive capital and leverage ratios
as in Section 2, and then evaluating the revised loss functions eqs. (7) and (8) with
these, we can state
Lemma 6. When systemic risk materializes through differential spillover effects, lo-
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cal/central regulators prefer risk sensitive capital ratios to leverage ratios if the cost of
discovering bank type mn is below the respective thresholds
m′n =
(q − 1)2κ2ω2n
4p(p2 − κ2) > 0, m
′′
s =
(φs(p
2 − κ2) + 4(q − 1)κωs)2
64p(p2 − κ2) > 0
and the reverse holds otherwise. The relative benefits of risk sensitive capital ratios at
the central level are increasing in the spillover differential φs associated with systemic
risk.
While local regulators’ choice is unaffected by the introduction of the systemic risk
element, the central regulator is shown to value risk sensitive capital ratios more the
greater the impact of systemic risk.11
It is then straightforward to obtain results that allow for the impact of systemic risk
as follows
Proposition 3. When central regulation is combined with supervision at the local level
and systemic risk materializes through differential spillover effects, central risk sensitive
capital ratios are preferable from an overall perspective if mn is below the threshold m
′′
s ,
whereas central leverage ratios are most preferred otherwise.
Our results reiterate that systemic risk matters for the optimal design of a regulatory
framework, and in particular that bank capital regulation would generally be more
beneficial at the central than at the local level the greater the impact of systemic risk in
the economy.12 Allowing for systemic risk properly in this context matters even more
the larger the spillover effects between regions, and the greater the extent to which local
regulators are subject to regulatory capture.
4.3 Asymmetry in regulatory capture at local level
Given our focus throughout on the importance of differences in regulatory capture
between local and central supervisors, it is of further interest to examine what approach
11This result is driven by the convexity in regulators’ loss functions, as optimal central leverage
ratios exceed expected risk sensitive capital requirements more the larger the spillover differential φs
associated with systemic risk.
12Detailed comparative statics results are available in the Appendix.
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to bank capital regulation is best from an overall perspective when there is asymmetry
in regulatory capture at the local level.
To address this issue, we remain once again within a framework where central reg-
ulation is combined with supervision at the local level. The loss function faced by the
central regulator is then simply eq. (1) where ms = mn; the loss functions considered
by the local regulators in regions A,B, on the other hand, are rewritten as
ΛnA = mn +
1
4
∑
i∈Θ
∑
j∈Θ
(piA(1− kiA)2 + (ωn − ωa) kiA (q − 1) + φpjB(1− kjB)) (9)
ΛnB = mn +
1
4
∑
i∈Θ
∑
j∈Θ
(piB(1− kiB)2 + (ωn + ωa) kiB (q − 1) + φpjA(1− kjA)) (10)
where ωa > 0 captures the degree of asymmetry in local regulators’ respective weights
on the opportunity cost of capital, to be interpreted here as asymmetry in regulatory
capture at the local level, with ωa < ωd.
13
While the central regulator’s choice is obviously unaffected by this, the local regula-
tor in region B values risk sensitive capital ratios more than their counterpart in region
A the larger the degree of asymmetry in regulatory capture at the local level. We can
then obtain a, now more complex, equivalent of Lemma 1 as
Lemma 7. Both local and central regulators prefer risk sensitive capital ratios if mn <
m′s or leverage ratios if mn > m
′
nB; the central regulator prefers leverage ratios while
both local regulators prefer risk sensitive capital ratios if m′s < mn < m
′
nA; the central
regulator and the local regulator in region A prefer leverage ratios while the local regulator
in region B prefers risk sensitive capital ratios if m′nA < mn < m
′
nB (the thresholds
m′nA,m
′
nB are defined in the Appendix).
It is then straightforward to obtain results that allow for the impact of asymmetry
in regulatory capture at the local level as follows
Proposition 4. When central regulation is combined with supervision at the local level
and there is asymmetry in regulatory capture at the local level, central risk sensitive
capital ratios are preferable from an overall perspective if mn is below the threshold
13Without loss of generality, we assume that the local regulator in region A attaches a lower weight
to the opportunity cost of capital than the one in region B, i.e. ωs < ω
A
n < ω
B
n .
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m′s, whereas central leverage ratios are most preferred otherwise. The relative benefits
of central vs. local regulation are larger the greater the degree of asymmetry ωa in
regulatory capture at the local level.
Our results thus highlight that bank capital regulation would generally be more
beneficial at the central than at the local level the greater the degree of asymmetry in
regulatory capture at the local level. Differences in the degree of regulatory capture
at the local level favor central regulation more the lower is (average) bank insolvency
risk, but the larger the difference in insolvency risk between different bank types and
the greater the difference in (average) regulatory capture between local and central
regulators.14
5 Conclusion
We developed a simple two-region model where local or central regulators set bank cap-
ital requirements as either risk sensitive capital or leverage ratios. Local regulators are
concerned about expected costs of their banks failing and the opportunity cost of capi-
tal, but ignore interregion spillovers associated with bank failures. A central regulator
internalizes the positive spillover effects of higher capital ratios, but faces a potentially
higher cost of observing bank types than local regulators due to its supervisory “re-
moteness”; it may furthermore attach less weight to banks’ opportunity cost of capital
if exposed to less regulatory capture than local regulators.
Our results demonstrated the importance of bank capital requirements being de-
termined at a central level particularly when interregion spillovers are large and local
regulators suffer from substantial degrees of regulatory capture. We stressed the impor-
tance for such a central regulator to address the potential issues relating to supervisory
“remoteness” in this context, and showed that local regulators may be inclined to sur-
render regulatory power to a central regulator only when spillover effects are large but
the degree of supervisory capture is relatively small. We also showed that bank capital
regulation at the central rather than the local level is more beneficial the larger the
impact of systemic risk and the greater the degree of asymmetry in regulatory capture
14Further details on these comparative statics results are available in the Appendix.
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at the local level.
The results are relevant for the optimal design of ”vertical” regulatory architecture in
any economy that has multiple bank regulators and/or supervisors at possibly different
levels, and may thus be of interest to policymakers regarding the evolving ”Single Su-
pervisory Mechanism” in Europe, the dual supervisory system existing in US banking,
or other analogous regional financial and regulatory arrangements across the globe.
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Appendix
A Proofs
Proof of Lemma 1 The central regulator’s loss differential ∆ssl,sr = Λ
s (ksA, k
s
B) −
Λs
(
kshA , k
sl
A , k
sh
B , k
sl
B
)
evaluates to
−2ms + (q − 1)
2κ2ω2s
2p(p2 − κ2)
while local regulators’ loss differentials ∆nnl,nr = Λ
n (knA, k
n
B)−Λn
(
knhA , k
nl
A , k
nh
B , k
nl
B
)
eval-
uate to
−mn + (q − 1)
2κ2ω2n
4p(p2 − κ2)
for which the roots m′s < m
′
n are readily obtained; the comparative statics
∂∆iil,ir
∂ωi
>
0,
∂∆iil,ir
∂κ
> 0 are straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 2 The respective loss differential ∆snl,sl = Λ
s (knA, k
n
B)−Λs (ksA, ksB)
evaluates to
(pφ+ (q − 1)ωd)2
2p
which is positive; the comparative statics
∂∆snl,sl
∂φ
> 0,
∂∆snl,sl
∂ωd
> 0 are then straightforward
to obtain.
The respective loss differential ∆snr,sr = Λ
s
(
knhA , k
nl
A , k
nh
B , k
nl
B
) − Λs (kshA , kslA , kshB , kslB)
evaluates to
1
2
(
−4md + (q − 1)2φωd + p(φ2 + (q − 1)
2ωd
2
p2 − κ2 )
)
for which the root m′d is readily obtained; the comparative statics
∂∆snr,sr
∂φ
> 0,
∂∆snr,sr
∂ωd
>
0,
∂∆snr,sr
∂κ
> 0 are straightforward.
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Proof of Lemma 3 The respective loss differential ∆snr,sl = Λ
s
(
knhA , k
nl
A , k
nh
B , k
nl
B
) −
Λs (ksA, k
s
B) evaluates to
2mn + φ(
1
2
pφ+ ωd(q − 1)) + (q − 1)
2(p2ωd
2 − κ2ω2s)
2p(p2 − κ2)
for which the root m′′n is readily obtained; the comparative statics
∂∆snr,sl
∂φ
> 0,
∂∆snr,sl
∂ωd
>
0,
∂∆snr,sl
∂κ
< 0 are reasonably straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 1 It holds thatm′s−m′′n = 14
(
p
(
(q−1)2ω2d
p2−κ2 + φ
2
)
+ 2(q − 1)φωd
)
>
0 (see Figure 2). Part 1 follows from Lemma 1 and Lemmas 2 and 3, resulting in
the preference ordering SR  SL  NR  NL or SR  SL  NL  NR, and
SL  NR  NL , SL  SR or SL  NL  NR , SL  SR, respectively. Part 2 fol-
lows from Lemmas 2 and 3, resulting in the preference ordering SR  NR  SL  NL
and NR  SL  NL , NR  SR, respectively.
Proof of Lemma 4 The respective loss differential ∆nnl,sl = Λ
n (knA, k
n
B)−Λn (ksA, ksB)
evaluates to
1
4
p
(
φ2 − (q − 1)
2ωd
2
p2
)
for which the (positive) root φ′ is readily obtained; the comparative statics
∂∆nnl,sl
∂ωd
< 0
are straightforward.
The respective loss differential ∆nnr,sr = Λ
n
(
knhA , k
nl
A , k
nh
B , k
nl
B
)− Λn (kshA , kslA , kshB , kslB)
evaluates to
1
4
p
(
φ2 − (q − 1)
2ωd
2
p2 − κ2
)
for which the (positive) root φ′′ is readily obtained; the comparative statics ∂∆
n
nr,sr
∂ωd
<
0,
∂∆nnr,sr
∂κ
< 0 are straightforward.
Proof of Lemma 5 The respective loss differential ∆nnr,sl = Λ
n
(
knhA , k
nl
A , k
nh
B , k
nl
B
) −
Λn (ksA, k
s
B) evaluates to
mn +
p
4
φ2 − (q − 1)
2(p2ωd
2 + κ2ωs(2ωd + ωs))
4p(p2 − κ2)
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This is positive for mn ≥ m′′′n = (q−1)
2(p2ωd
2+κ2ωs(2ωd+ωs))
4p(p2−κ2) ; as m
′′′
n > m
′
n, however, local
regulators actually prefer leverage to risk sensitive capital ratios in that region (from
Lemma 1). The (positive) root φ′′′ is readily obtained otherwise; the comparative statics
∂∆nnr,sl
∂mn
> 0,
∂∆nnr,sl
∂ωd
< 0,
∂∆nnr,sl
∂κ
< 0 are straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 2 It was previously shown that m′s < m
′
n holds (see Figure
1). Then in line with Lemma 1, Lemma 4 applies if mn < m
′
s or mn > m
′
n, and Lemma
5 applies if m′s < mn < m
′
n.
Proof of Lemma 6 The central regulator’s loss differential ∆ssl,sr evaluates to
−2ms + (φs(p
2 − κ2) + 4(q − 1)κωs)2
32p(p2 − κ2)
while local regulator’s loss differential ∆nnl,nr evaluate to
−mn + (q − 1)
2κ2ω2n
4p(p2 − κ2)
for which the roots m′′s ,m
′
n are readily obtained; the comparative statics
∂∆ssl,sr
∂φs
>
0,
∂∆nnl,nr
∂φs
= 0 are straightforward.
Proof of Proposition 3 In this case, central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferred
to local ones throughout as the respective loss differential ∆snr,sr evaluates to
1
16
(
(4φ+ φs) (φsκ+ 4ωd(q − 1)) + p
(
8φ2 + 4φφs + φ
2
s +
8(q − 1)2ω2d
(p2 − κ2)
))
> 0
Also, central leverage ratios are always preferred to local ones as the respective loss
differential ∆snl,sl evaluates to
(p(4φ+ φs) + φsκ+ 4(q − 1)ωd)2
32p
> 0
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This results in the following preference ordering when mn < m
′′
s : SR  SL  NL and
SR  NR. When mn > m′′s , we have SL  SR  NR and SL  NL.
Proof of Lemma 7 When there is asymmetry in regulatory capture at the local level,
local regulators in regions A,B and the central regulator prefer risk sensitive capital
ratios to leverage ratios if the cost of discovering bank type mn is below the respective
thresholds
m′nA =
(q − 1)2κ2 (ωn − ωa)2
4p(p2 − κ2) > 0 , m
′
nB =
(q − 1)2κ2 (ωn + ωa)2
4p(p2 − κ2) > 0
m′s =
(q − 1)2κ2ω2s
4p(p2 − κ2) > 0
and the reverse holds otherwise. We then have m′nB > m
′
nA > m
′
s.
Proof of Proposition 4 In this case, central risk sensitive capital ratios are preferred
to local ones throughout as the respective loss differential ∆snr,sr evaluates to
1
2
(
2(q − 1)φωd + p(φ2 + (q − 1)
2 (ω2d + ω
2
a)
p2 − κ2 )
)
> 0
Also, central leverage ratios are always preferred to local ones as the respective loss
differential ∆snl,sl evaluates to
(pφ+ (q − 1)ωd)2 + (q − 1)2ω2a
2p
> 0
Finally, central leverage ratios are preferred to local leverage ratios in region A combined
with local risk sensitive capital ratios in region B if the respective loss differential
∆snlArB ,sl , which evaluates to
2p (p2 − κ2) (4mn + pφ2 + 2(q − 1)φωd)
4p (p2 − κ2) +
(q − 1)2 (2p2 (ω2d + ω2a)− κ2 ((ωd − ωa)2 + ω2s))
4p (p2 − κ2)
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is positive; this is satisfied if
mn > m
′′′
n =
(q − 1)2κ2 ((ωd − ωa)2 + ω2s)
8p (p2 − κ2) −
2p ((p2 − κ2) (pφ2 + 2(q − 1)φωd) + p(q − 1)2 (ω2d + ω2a))
8p (p2 − κ2)
which holds in the region (see Figure 3) where mn > m
′
s as
m′s −m′′′n =
(q − 1)2 (2p2 (ω2d + ω2a) + κ2 (ω2s − (ωd − ωa)2))
8p (p2 − κ2) +
2pφ (p2 − κ2) (pφ+ 2(q − 1)ωd)
8p (p2 − κ2) > 0
with ωa < ωd < ωs by assumption.
This results in the following preference ordering when mn < m
′
s : SR  SL  NL
and SR  NR. When mn > m′s, we have SL  SR  NR, SL  NL and SL 
NLARB.
In line with Lemma 7, the relevant comparative statics result on the relative benefits
of central vs. local regulation with respect to the degree of asymmetry ωa in local
regulators’ respective weights on the opportunity cost of capital in this case are
∂∆snr,sr
∂ωa
=
∂∆snr,sl
∂ωa
=
p(q − 1)2ωa
p2 − κ2 > 0
∂∆snl,sl
∂ωa
=
(q − 1)2ωa
p
> 0
∂∆snlArB ,sl
∂ωa
=
(q − 1)2 (ωa (2p2 − κ2) + κ2ωd)
2p (p2 − κ2) > 0
B Further comparative statics
Comparative statics for Proposition 1 The relative benefits of central vs. local
regulation are greater the larger the spillover φ and regulators’ weight differential on
the opportunity cost of capital ωd. They are also greater the larger the difference in
insolvency risk between bank types κ when mn < m
′′
s , inversely related to it when
m′′s < mn < m
′
n, but unaffected by it when mn > m
′
n.
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This follows from the comparative statics in Lemmas 2 and 3.
Comparative statics for Proposition 2 From local regulators’ perspective, the
relative benefits of central vs. local regulation are smaller the larger regulators’ weight
differential on the opportunity cost of capital ωd. They are also (weakly) smaller the
larger the difference in insolvency risk between bank types κ, and (weakly) greater the
larger local supervisors’ cost of discovering bank type mn.
This follows from the comparative statics in Lemmas 4 and 5.
Comparative statics for Proposition 3 When the spillover differential φs associ-
ated with systemic risk is not too large, i.e. φs < φ
′
s, the relative benefits of central vs.
local regulation are larger the greater the degree of systemic risk affecting the economy
when mn < m
′′
s or mn > m
′
n, or as long as pωd > κωs (a sufficient condition) when
m′′s < mn < m
′
n. The impact of the degree of systemic risk on the relative benefits of
central vs. local regulation is greater the larger the spillover φ and regulators’ weight
differential on the opportunity cost of capital ωd; it is also greater the larger the dif-
ference in insolvency risk between bank types κ when mn < m
′′
s or mn > m
′
n, but
indeterminate when m′′s < mn < m
′
n.
These results hold noting that, as long as the spillover differential φs associated with
systemic risk is sufficiently small, i.e. φs < φ
′
s =
4(q−1)κ(ωn−ωs)
p2−κ2 , Lemma 1 holds (with
ms = mn). Then, the relevant comparative statics results on the relative benefits of
central vs. local regulation with respect to the degree of systemic risk φs in this case
are
∂∆snr,sr
∂φs
=
1
8
((2φ+ φs)(p+ κ) + 2(q − 1)ωd) > 0
∂∆snl,sl
∂φs
=
(p+ κ) (p(4φ+ φs) + φsκ+ 4(q − 1)ωd)
16p
> 0
and
∂∆snr,sl
∂φs
=
p2(4φ+ φs) + 2pκ(2φ+ φs) + φsκ
2 + 4 (q − 1) (pωd − κωs)
16p
for which a sufficient condition to be positive clearly is pωd > κωs. The respective
second-order partial derivatives ∂
2∆s
∂φs∂φ
> 0, ∂
2∆s
∂φs∂ωd
> 0 and
∂2∆snr,sr
∂φs∂κ
> 0,
∂2∆snl,sl
∂φs∂κ
>
23
0,
∂2∆snr,sl
∂φs∂κ
≷ 0 are then straightforward to obtain.
Comparative statics for Proposition 4 The impact of the degree of asymmetry
in regulatory capture at the local level on the relative benefits of central vs. local
regulation is lower the higher is average bank insolvency risk p; it is (weakly) greater
the larger the difference in insolvency risk between bank types κ and local and central
regulators’ (average) weight differential on the opportunity cost of capital ωd.
This follows from the respective second-order partial derivatives ∂
2∆s
∂φs∂p
< 0, ∂
2∆s
∂φs∂κ
≥
0, ∂
2∆s
∂φs∂ωd
≥ 0, which are reasonably straightforward to obtain.
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Figure 1: Regulators’ preference of risk-sensitive capital (RW) vs leverage (Lev) ratios
depending on cost of discovering bank type
Figure 2: Regulators’ preference of risk-sensitive capital vs leverage ratios and further
cost threshold of discovering bank type
Figure 3: Regulators’ preference of risk-sensitive capital vs leverage ratios and alterna-
tive cost thresholds of discovering bank type
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